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Aviews like these, then, vagueness in the law is—or at least can be— instru-
mentally valuable.1
In this article, I want to point out what I take to be a rather com-
mon mistake underlying the attribution of instrumental value to vague-
ness in the law. Although I think that it does in fact have some such value,2
it seems to me that many authors ðincluding Endicott and WaldronÞ
wrongly associate vagueness with instrumental roles that are really played
by a closely related semantic phenomenon—what I call incommensurate
multidimensionality. Incommensurate multidimensionality entails vague-
ness, so it is perhaps unsurprising that the former is sometimes mistaken
for the latter. Such a mistake, however, has significant consequences when
it comes to the proper attribution of instrumental value, because value
only “transmits” from ends to means but not to necessary consequences
of those means.
I begin by explaining very briefly what kind of vagueness is sup-
posed to be a valuable feature of law and how incommensurate multi-
dimensionality entails such vagueness. Next, I examine the arguments
made by Endicott and Waldron, arguing that their key premises are based
on a mistake—incommensurate multidimensionality, rather than vague-
ness, facilitates the relevant legal ends. I devote most of my discussion to
Endicott’s argument and then go on to show how my critique carries
over to Waldron’s. After that, I consider what seems like the most nat-
ural general response to my critique: to argue that because using vague
terms is a necessary consequence of using multidimensional terms, using
the former is actually a necessary means to using the latter. Given the
transitivity of the is-a-means-to relation, it would follow that value does
in fact transmit from the relevant legislative ends to vagueness. I argue
that there is a general reason why this strategy fails: it is not generally
true that if something is a necessary consequence of a means to some
end, then it is also a means to that end. Finally, I note that—indepen-
dently of any considerations of means and ends—Standard Deontic Logic
ðSDLÞ validates a principle that, given my concession that incommensu-
rate multidimensionality is sometimes a good thing, seems to force on
me the conclusion that vagueness is sometimes a good thing, too. I
mention in brief a number of ways to avoid this conclusion, in order to
acknowledge that—and illustrate how—in making claims about how to
reason with value statements, one incurs significant commitments in the
logic of value.1. Throughout the article, ‘instrumental value’ refers to the value that something has in
virtue of its being a means to something good—in this sense, then, not all means have
instrumental value.
2. See, e.g., Hrafn Asgeirsson, “Vagueness and Power-Delegation in Law: A Reply to
Sorensen,” in Current Legal Issues: Law and Language, ed. Michael Freeman and Fiona Smith
ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2013Þ, 344–55.
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AI. INCOMMENSURATE MULTIDIMENSIONALITY, EXTRAVAGANT
VAGUENESS, AND ENDICOTT’S ARGUMENT FROM
INSTRUMENTAL NECESSITY
Many natural language expressions are associated with multiple dimen-
sions; consider, for example, the term ‘crowd’, the proper application of
which ðin a contextÞ depends on the number of people and the density
of the relevant gathering. It is also quite common that two or more of
the dimensions of such expressions are incommensurate—that is, to use
Timothy Endicott’s phrase, they correspond to “attributes that cannot
be measured in common units.”3 There is no nonarbitrary way, for ex-
ample, to measure how the decrease in the number of people in a gath-
ering can be offset by an increase in its density so that it still counts as a
crowd.
According to Endicott, incommensurate multidimensionality en-
tails vagueness. The reason, he says, is that incommensurability across
associated dimensions entails partially defined comparatives ð‘is more/less
F than’Þ, which in turn entail the absence of a sharp boundary between
the relevant predicate’s determinate extension and determinate anti-
extension ði.e., there is no sharp boundary between the Fs and the non-
FsÞ.4 And if there is no such boundary, then the relevant predicate is
vague. Further, as the number of incommensurate dimensions increases,
the indeterminate cases will start to crowd out the determinate ones, and,
eventually, we get what Endicott calls extravagant vagueness, which he pri-
marily associates with normative terms. Paradigmatic examples of extrav-
agantly vague terms in the law include, for example, ‘neglect’ and ‘rea-
sonable’, both of which are associated with multiple incommensurate
dimensions, and both of which are common in tort, contract, and ad-
ministrative law ðand the latter even in commercial lawÞ.53. Timothy Endicott, Vagueness in Law ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2000Þ, 42. Two
attributes can fail to be measurable in a common unit in at least two ways: ðiÞ the attributes
may each have a natural numerical ordering, but there is no common unit to which the
relevant scales can nonarbitrarily be reduced, and ðiiÞ the attributes may not have any
natural numerical ordering.
4. See ibid., 36 ðesp. n. 6Þ. The basic idea is that if the attributes associated with a term
cannot bemeasured in common units, then for every ðactual or possibleÞx, there will be some
ðactual or possibleÞ y, such that it is indeterminate whether x is more/less F than y. If so,
then there will be no x such that ðiÞ for every y that is F, x is less F than, or just as F as, y,
and ðiiÞ for every z that is not F, x is more F than z.
5. In addition to it being unsettled how the relevant dimensions of such terms
“interact,” with respect to their proper application, it is often significantly unsettled exactly
what the relevant dimensions are. Thanks to an editor at Ethics for pressing me to address
this point.
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AEndicott argues that extravagant vagueness of this kind is instru-
mentally valuable to law. The primary motivation for this conclusion is the
following claim: extravagant vagueness is a necessary means for achiev-
ing general regulation of a widely varying range of conduct.6 In many leg-
islative contexts, he says, precise schemes of regulation are impossible, and
so the only means for regulating the relevant forms of human conduct is
to issue vague norms. Thus, according to Endicott, lawmakers sometimes
have to use extravagantly vague terms, if they wish to regulate. In order,
for example, to adequately prevent, and punish, conduct that is espe-
cially damaging to children, he says, the law must use terms like ‘neglect’
and ‘abandoned’ ðor approximate—and usually nonexhaustive—defini-
tions thereof which are themselves extravagantly vagueÞ. Assuming—as
we certainly can in this case—that it is valuable to prevent such conduct,
it follows that extravagant vagueness is an instrumentally valuable fea-
ture of law, despite the fact that such vagueness is likely both to pro-
duce borderline cases that are practically consequential and to generate
serious and deep disputes over the relevant norm’s principles of appli-
cation. Or so Endicott argues.
Let us say that the law adequately regulates undesirable conduct if it
prevents an adequate number of instances of it and adequately punishes
the instances that do occur. We can then analyze Endicott’s argument in
the following way:76
guage
14–30
7
8
regar
pro ta
icott
cludin
ll use P1. Adequately regulating conduct that is especially damaging to
children is good.
P2. Vagueness in the law is a necessary means to adequately reg-
ulating conduct that is especially damaging to children.
P3. Value transmits from ends to means.
C. Vagueness in the law is ðsometimesÞ instrumentally good.I am prepared to accept the argument as valid, and I certainly do not
wish to dispute P1. The principle P3—which I take to be an axiom in the
logic of value—is also pretty solid, so long as we take it to transmit pro
tanto value: if x is all-things-considered good and y is a necessary means to
x, then x is pro tanto instrumentally good.8 What I have to do, then, is to. See Timothy Endicott, “The Value of Vagueness,” in Philosophical Foundations of Lan-
in theLaw, ed.AndreiMarmorandScottSoames ðOxford:Oxford University Press, 2011Þ,
, 28.
. Thanks to Olav Gjelsvik for helpful discussion about Endicott’s argument.
. Thanks to Henry S. Richardson and an editor at Ethics for helpful comments
ding P3. Note that one could choose to limit the conclusion to vagueness in the law being
nto good, subject to possible outweighing, or one could go further and agree with End-
that its pro tanto goodness outweighs whatever pro tanto badness it may have, con-
g—as Endicott does—that vagueness in the law is ðsometimesÞ good, all things con-
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Acast doubt on P2: that is, to show that—despite appearances to the con-
trary—vagueness is not a necessary means to adequately regulating con-
duct that is especially damaging to children. My focus will be on the term
‘neglect’, as it is used in child care law, since this is one of Endicott’s
favorite examples of vague terms that lawmakers have to use, if they are to
properly regulate human affairs.9
II. INCOMMENSURATE MULTIDIMENSIONALITY
IS DOING THE REAL WORK
According to Endicott, the issue that is immediately relevant to deter-
mining the instrumental value of vagueness in the law is that terms like
‘neglect’ cannot possibly be replaced by precise phrases that are suffi-
ciently similar to these terms in their extension, or by any disjunctions
thereof. In general, only terms that have one or more totally ordered di-
mensions, or that are otherwise significantly correlated with such an attri-
bute, can be so replaced. ‘Citizens are required to drive safely’, for exam-
ple, can be replaced with ‘Citizens are required to drive at no more than
n mph’ in tandem with a host of other more or less precise rules, because
speed is such a weighty factor in safe driving, and the resulting scheme
of laws can still be said to have the purpose of preventing automobile-
related accidents/injuries/damage. This is similarly true with ‘Only ma-
ture citizens may vote’ and ‘Only citizens older than n years of age may
vote’ ðeven though age is only a significantly correlated attribute, since
age is not something in virtue of which one counts as matureÞ.
Vague terms or phrases that are not associated with any attribute
that can be quantitatively measured, on the other hand, do not generally
admit of replacement by relatively precise alternatives, nor do terms that
are associated with a relatively insignificant proportion of such dimen-
sions, since—in most cases—the resulting regulation could not properly
be said to be a regulation of the conduct in question ðmore on this below,
in Sec. IVÞ. Arguably, ‘neglect’ falls in the latter category, since, although
time ðspent with or away from one’s childrenÞ and age ðof, say, baby-
sittersÞ are certainly relevant attributes, these dimensions—along with
other totally ordered dimensions—do not suffice to make for an ade-sidered. Note also that I leave it open how much value P3 transmits from ends to means.
For a valuable discussion of transmission principles for ‘ought’/reasons and related prob-
lems, see Niko Kolodny, “Instrumental Reasons,” forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Rea-
sons and Normativity, ed. Daniel Star ðOxford: Oxford University PressÞ.
9. I should also note thatmy discussion owes a great deal both to Kolodny, “Instrumental
Reasons,” and to Scott Soames, “What Vagueness and Inconsistency Tell Us about Interpre-
tation,” in Marmor and Soames, Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law, 31–57.
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Aquate replacement. In these cases, vagueness is indeed necessary for the
relevant regulatory ends. But that, I hope to show, does not suffice for
vagueness to have value, even if the ends in question are valuable.
Let me begin by saying that what lawmakers have to do in order
to regulate a wide variety of conduct with a general standard is not—in
the first instance—to use terms that are vague. Rather, it is to use broad
general terms associated with multiple incommensurate dimensions,
or perhaps to use approximate ðand usually nonexhaustiveÞ definitions
thereof which are themselves highly general and multidimensional.
ðIt is important to note that nonexhaustive definitions do not replace their
definienda; rather, they are meant to be guidelines for application.Þ Endi-
cott even indicates as much in at least two places. He claims, for example,
that the relevant issue regarding negligence law is the “sheer, mind-
boggling variety of ways in which people can create more or less un-
reasonable risks to other people” and that the relevant issue regarding
child care law is the “daunting variety of things that a child needs from
its parents ½which corresponds to a wide variety of ways in which a par-
ent may more or less neglect a child.”10
Now, I think that Endicott is right that extravagantly vague laws
generally do not have any relatively precise replacements, since terms
tend to be extravagantly vague due to the fact that they have multiple
dimensions that cannot be measured in a common metric ðand some
are bound to be impossible to measure in any reasonable way, at least
cardinallyÞ. But I think he is wrong in maintaining that this is the issue
that is relevant to determining whether vagueness has value in virtue
of being a necessary means. The reason, I will argue, is that vagueness
is not the semantic feature that helps bring about this “general regu-
lation of a widely varying range of conduct.”11 Rather, incommensurate
multidimensionality is doing the real work.
To see this, consider the following general features of the rele-
vant lawmaking scenarios, where, again, the law adequately regulates un-
desirable conduct if it prevents an adequate number of instances of it
and adequately punishes the instances that do occur. First, lawmakers
need/want to adequately regulate a ðpossibly open-endedÞ set of mul-
tiple related types of behavior. Second, there exists a term denoting the
relevant set, a highly general term with multiple incommensurate di-
mensions.12 Third, it is not possible for lawmakers to compile a list—10. Endicott, “Value of Vagueness,” 25, 24.
11. Ibid., 28.
12. Note that worries about family resemblances are premature, since it suffices for
this characterization that, for example, ‘game’ denotes a property that is informative and
necessary of all instances of every subtype of game—such as chess, solitaire, and golf. It is only
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Aprecise or not—of less general terms, such that ðdisjunctivelyÞ they ade-
quately cover the relevant set, vis-a`-vis the relevant legislative purposes.
In Endicott’s favored example, for instance, lawmakers want to pro-
hibit certain forms of conduct in order to prevent certain types of harm
to children ðand to punish instances that do occurÞ, namely, ðsomething
likeÞ those types that constitute unreasonable failure on behalf of parents
to pay attention to the needs that their children have in virtue of their
parent-child relationship. And indeed there exists a term that covers the
relevant forms of behavior—namely, ‘neglect’. Due to the nature of such
conduct, however, it is not possible for lawmakers to devise a list of less
general terms—precise or not—that disjunctively covers an adequate
amount of the relevant behavior ði.e., an adequately coextensive list of
action-type termsÞ. As Scott Soames notes: “one who undertook the task
of more precisely delineating either ½the class of clear neglect or the class
of clear nonneglect using only more highly-focused language designating
specific behavior—about the regularity and content of meals, frequency
of trips to doctors, time with parents, age of baby-sitters, and the like—
would . . .find it stupefying at best, and practically impossible, at worst.”13
If lawmakers were to try to use any such attempted list, they would
likely get things gravely wrong; they would probably end up failing to
prevent ðand punishÞ a significant amount of harmful conduct as well
as prevent ðand punishÞ a significant amount of nonharmful conduct.
That is, any attempt to come up with a list would result in excessively
over- and underinclusive regulation.14 Lawmakers, then, should not at-
tempt to specify the set of action types intended to be prohibited. Given
that they want to adequately prevent ðand punishÞ harm that is espe-
cially damaging to children, they should rather use the term ‘neglect’ or
some approximate—and presumably nonexhaustive—high-level defini-
tion thereof.15
III. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SPECIFICATION
There are, of course, a variety of ways in which something can be im-
possible, and so far I haven’t said anything about in what sense it is im-
possible for lawmakers to devise an adequate,more specific, list of terms. Is13. Soames, “Vagueness and Inconsistency,” 40.
14. The law does have some tools for handling errors like these—such as the
necessity defense; more on this in Sec. IV below.
in relation to the exact nature of this property that issues about family resemblances come
up, since no one would deny that, necessarily, chess, solitaire, and golf are all games.
15. That, for example, is what UK lawmakers did when they wrote the Child and Young
Persons Act ð1933Þ; Endicott, “Value of Vagueness,” 24.
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Ait metaphysically impossible or epistemically impossible or perhaps sim-
ply practically impossible?
It may be tempting to think that the impossibility of compiling
an informative list of subtypes of neglect has to do with the context-
sensitive nature of evaluation. And presumably it does have something
to do with it. However, the immediate issue of unspecifiability has nothing
to do with evaluation, as such. To see this, let us say that someone who
utters ‘The Smiths have been neglectful toward their child’ succeeds in
communicating the proposition that the Smiths have unreasonably failed
to pay attention to the needs of their child.16 We can—at least for practical
purposes—separate the evaluative aspect of this ðrough, but sufficientÞ
analysis from the descriptive aspect and focus just on the latter ði.e.,
on the proposition that the Smiths failed to pay attention to the needs of their
childÞ. With respect to unspecifiability, ‘neglect’ is in an important sense
no different from many purely descriptive terms: just as there is a vast
variety of ways, for example, in which people can walk to work or use a
firearm, so there is a vast variety of ways in which people can, as par-
ents, fail to pay attention to the needs of their children ðin part due
to the diversity of a child’s needsÞ. In general, there is nothing distinc-
tively evaluative about the inability to list exhaustively the ways in which
one can realize a given action type, even if the relevant term is properly
characterized as evaluative; we could repeat this line of reasoning, for
example, with ‘cruel’, ‘lewd’, ‘unjust’, and so forth.
Now, this inability could merely be practical. Perhaps there is a
finite number of ways in which parents can fail to pay attention to the
needs of their children, but for practical reasons we just can’t list them.
Or there is a countably infinite number of ways, and so it is impossible
to know what a complete list looks like. If so, then it will of course also
be impossible to construct one. Or perhaps the number is uncountably
infinite, in which case any sort of complete list is impossible ðtry, e.g.,
to imagine counting possible worldsÞ, let alone knowable or humanly
constructible.
To be sure, when it comes to normative terms, there is a further—
potentially significant—complication: we are only interested in those
instantiations of the relevant types that have the further property of
being unjustified ðwhatever property that turns out to beÞ. If parents,
for example, for justifying reasons do not feed their children regular16. I say ‘communicates’ because I wish to remain neutral about the “linguistic
location” of the evaluative aspect of such an utterance. That is, nothing turns on if the
evaluative aspect is part of the semantics of the term or if it gets attached pragmatically ðby
way of pragmatic enrichment, implicature, or presuppositionÞ.
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Anutritious meals—say, during a widespread famine—then presumably
we wouldn’t complain that they are being neglectful.17 So, what we are
ultimately after is a list of action types in ðtypes ofÞ circumstances: A1
in C1, A2 in C2, and so on. Each item on this more complicated list,
then, is what is correctly said to be less general than ‘neglect’, even if
the relation isn’t straightforwardly taxonomic ðlike it is with ‘tiger’ and
‘mammal’Þ.
Thus, even if we had a reasonable list of action types that corre-
sponds to the ways in which parents can fail to pay attention to their
children’s needs, we would need to revise that list so as to include only
unreasonable instantiations of those types. And here, we are faced with
a problem similar to the immediate one described above, in that we
need a list of exceptions, determined by a theory of right and wrong
action. Depending on one’s metaethical view, however, such a list may
be finite, countably infinite, or uncountably infinite. Only if the list of
exceptions is finite and practically manageable can we expect an ade-
quate specification of ‘neglect’. This is a tall order, and probably not
to be expected. As Pekka Va¨yrynen has pointed out, outside ethics it has
not proved promising to provide finite lists of exceptions to ceteris paribus
generalizations, and there is no a priori reason to think that ethics is special
in that respect.18
If what I have said in this section and in the section before it is
true, then we have good reason to believe that using terms that are asso-
ciated with multiple incommensurate dimensions is a necessary means
for adequately regulating, for example, conduct that is especially dam-
aging to children. This, of course, does not suffice to show decisively
that Endicott’s P2 is false, since A’s being a necessary means to C does
not preclude B from also being a necessary means to C, but it does very
strongly suggest that vagueness is not what is really doing the work, vis-
a`-vis the regulation of the relevant forms of conduct. If that is correct,
then—at the very least—the support for P2 goes away.
In the next section, I want to tackle an issue that I have left un-
addressed so far. I have been taking it pretty much for granted that using
a certain set of terms is indeed a necessary means for regulating con-
duct that is especially damaging to children and that the primary issue17. Or consider the morality-based motivation for allowing battered mothers to seek
a defense of duress or of diminished capacity against prosecution for Failure to Protect.
18. Pekka Va¨yrynen, “ATheory of HedgedMoral Principles,”Oxford Studies in Metaethics
4 ð2009Þ: 91–132; citing, e.g., Jerry Fodor, “You Can Fool Some of the People All of the
Time, Everything Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanations,”Mind 100
ð1991Þ: 19–34; and Paul Pietroski and Georges Rey, “When Other Things Aren’t Equal: Saving
Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 ð1995Þ: 81–110.
This content downloaded from 131.227.177.015 on September 29, 2016 01:17:01 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
434 Ethics January 2015
Ais what semantic aspect of those terms is doing the work. But, as I hope
to show below, it is not obvious that this is true. In many cases, it is better
to regulate conduct with terms or phrases that are associated with rela-
tively few dimensions—and which are therefore relatively precise—than
with vague multidimensional terms. The question is why this is not also
the case when it comes to regulating conduct that is especially damag-
ing to children. Why exactly are there supposed to be no good proxies
for terms like ‘neglect’, as it is used in child care law?
IV. ARE INCOMMENSURATE MULTIDIMENSIONALITY AND—
HENCE—VAGUENESS REALLY NECESSARY?
Let us suppose, on the basis of what I said in the previous section, that
it is in fact—at a minimum—practically impossible to compile a list
of action types ðin circumstancesÞ that is necessarily coextensive with
‘neglect’. It is natural to wonder whether this is any different from
other forms of conduct that lawmakers have an interest in regulating.
Surely, in many cases, lawmakers do the right thing by trying to replace
general terms with something more specific—and thus often better
action guiding—even if it results in a specification that is likely to be
both over- and underinclusive. Sometimes, it is simply better to settle
for some sort of rough approximation. When it comes to drinking and
voting age, for example, it would make bad sense to formulate the law
in terms of maturity. Given the extent to which people would be at the
mercy of officials and the cost of evaluating each case, it is better to
avoid that mess and make age the legally relevant factor, as was done
in the National Minimum Drinking Age Act ð23 U.S.C. §158 ½1984Þ and
in the Twenty-Sixth Amendment of the US Constitution.
Why shouldn’t we do something similar with ‘neglect’? Couldn’t
we, for example, either construct an admittedly underinclusive but man-
ageable list of relevant action types or find some quantifiable aspect—
such as the minimum age of babysitters, minimum number of visits to
the doctor per month, minimum number and nutritional value of meals
per day, and so on—and rely on available legal tools, such as legal de-
fenses, to mitigate any over- and underinclusiveness? The significance
here of settling this issue is that if neither incommensurate multidimen-
sionality nor vagueness is strictly necessary for the relevant lawmaking,
then Endicott’s P2 is straightforwardly false, and it would be superfluous
for me to argue that despite its necessity vagueness does not inherit any
value from the relevant ends. In addition, one of the main sources of
appeal of Endicott’s argument is that it is an argument from instrumental
necessity and, accordingly, promises to be significantly stronger than ar-
guments from facilitation.This content downloaded from 131.227.177.015 on September 29, 2016 01:17:01 AM
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AIn the case of neglect, I do not think it is possible to do away with
incommensurate multidimensionality/vagueness in the way suggested,
and I think we can see why if we attend to the fact that the relational
notion of being an adequate proxy has—for our purposes—two relevant
dimensions. Let us say that a term t1 is an adequate proxy for a term t2
if and only if it is not the case that the product of the number of errors
and their disvalue resulting from the use of t1 > the product of the num-
ber of errors and their disvalue resulting from the use of t2.
19 What makes
the suggestions in the previous paragraph inadequate proxies has, I
think, primarily to do with the gravity of the resulting errors—that is, with
the gravity of the over- and underinclusiveness ðand the limits of legal
tools to mitigate these; more on this belowÞ. It seems to me that, on any
reasonable theory of value, what is at stake in adequately preventing child
neglect is considerably weightier than what is at stake in preventing, say,
immature people from voting or drinking.
By saying this, I just mean that the interest that children have in
not being subject to neglect ðunderinclusionÞ and the interest that par-
ents have in not being held legally responsible for morally permissible or
excused conduct ðoverinclusionÞ is weightier or stronger than any com-
parable interests that may be present in the context of voting and drink-
ing. If so, then it is reasonable to think that instances of over- and un-
derinclusiveness in the attempt to regulate child neglect will be quite
serious. And given that any attempt to provide a fairly specific, but man-
ageable, list of relevant conduct is likely to be widely off the mark, if not
entirely so, we can reasonably say that the resulting over- and under-
inclusiveness would be excessive. Given the number of errors and their
disvalue, it is too off the mark to count as a means to the lawmakers’ end
of adequately preventing and punishing child neglect. This provides, I
believe, a reasonable explanation why nothing will make for a relatively
precise proxy for ‘neglect’, as opposed, for example, to ‘mature’.
It is worth emphasizing here that whether a term is an adequate
proxy for some other term of course depends on a multitude of fac-
tors. My argument above, for example, presupposes that subjects, courts,
and agencies are more or less competent to respond reasonably to reg-
ulation using a term like ‘neglect’. But if such regulation were shown to
systematically prompt parents, judges, or agency officials to make biased
or prejudicial decisions regarding the welfare of children, then it would
perhaps no longer be so clear that ‘neglect’ lacked an adequate proxy.
Under such circumstances, we might conceivably do equally well or bet-19. Note here that ‘ti’ can denote either what we would normally call a single term or a
set thereof.
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Ater to try to come up with a relatively specific list of behaviors to pro-
hibit, even if this would in fact result in a significant number of grave
errors. Now, as a matter of fact, I do not think that this is the case—
there really is no adequate proxy for ‘neglect’ in child care law, I be-
lieve. It is important, however, to stress that adequate proxyhood, as I have
defined it, is a comparative relation and that a great variety of things
ðincluding, e.g., the competence of officialsÞ may affect whether one
term is an adequate proxy for another, because they affect the number
and gravity of errors resulting from the use of the relevant terms.20
This brings me to another possible objection to my claim that
‘neglect’ has no adequate proxy, vis-a`-vis child care law. I have said that
any attempt to provide a fairly specific, but manageable, list of relevant
conduct is likely to result in excessive over- and underinclusiveness,
given the number of errors and—most significantly—their great disvalue.
I have also said, however, that the law does have some tools for handling
errors like these—most notably legal defenses that aim at exculpating
those who break the law excusably or justifiably ðsuch as Insanity and
Necessity, respectivelyÞ. The potential problem for me here is that if such
tools reliably reduce the number of errors, then it makes sense—especially
in this particular case, given the emphasis on gravity—to ask whether I
may be overestimating the negative outcome of enumerating a set of
relatively specific requirements as a proxy for prohibiting ‘neglect’. Does
perhaps such an enumeration qualify as an adequate proxy once we take
into account established legal tools designed specifically to remedy over-
and underinclusiveness?
Although the law is indeed capable of remedying some of the rel-
evant errors, the answer—I think—is still no. The reason is that the rele-
vant legal tools are subject to several significant limitations. The ne-
cessity—or “lesser evils”—defense, for example, which allows for acquittal
in case the defendant’s best course of action really was to break the law,
is in general not known to people, and authorities arguably have an in-
terest in keeping it that way.21 This means that circumstances in which
subjects will do what is best—by breaking the law—are likely to be rela-
tively rare. And even if people did know about the defense, they would
presumably be very hesitant to take the risk and hope for a successful
outcome. In fact, it seems that they should be hesitant, since—as Gideon
Yaffe has pointed out—the calculation of lesser/greater evils is far from
consistent between courts, because it is not settled ðin any jurisdictionÞ20. Thanks to a reviewer at Ethics for pressing me to highlight this aspect of being an
adequate proxy.
21. For a discussion, see Meir Dan-Cohen, “Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law,” in Harmful Thoughts: Essays on Law, Self, and Morality
ðPrinceton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002Þ, 37–93.
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Awhat standards are to be employed in evaluating the alternatives or what
it is exactly that needs to be better than what.22
In addition to all this, legal defenses can only mitigate the effects
of overinclusion. But in the case of neglect, in contrast to most other
legislative scenarios,23 underinclusion is arguably the more serious side
of the coin ðor at least equally seriousÞ, and the only possible way of mit-
igating underinclusion seems to be the employment of expansive pur-
posive legal interpretation. But this presupposes that cases of under-
inclusion reliably reach the courts, and much has to happen for a case
that is not covered by the law ðbut which should beÞ to get that far in the
system. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that most cases of un-
derinclusion will stay out of the courts’ reach, and, as a result, judicial in-
terpretation is a rather inefficient tool for dealing with underinclusion.
From all this, it seems to me appropriate to conclude that in the
case of neglect, using a list of fairly specific action types is not an option
that is available to lawmakers, given their end to adequately regulate
the relevant form of conduct. I won’t venture to define the threshold
that—no doubt, vaguely—divides courses of action into means and non-
means, relative to ends, but I do think we can say that, whatever that
threshold is, using a set of fairly precise requirements just cannot be
considered a means to adequately regulating conduct that is especially
damaging to children. It is just too far off the mark.
As I have hinted at, I do not think that lawmakers are required
to use the term ‘neglect’ undefined, as UK lawmakers, for example, did
in the Children and Young Persons Act.24 It may well be that although
no manageable list will count as an adequate proxy, some sort of ap-
proximating high-level definition will. In the United States, for ex-
ample, the federal government provides a nonexhaustive definition of
‘neglect’ that constrains any state legislation: “the term . . . means, at a
minimum, any recent . . . failure to act on the part of a parent or care-
taker, which results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, sex-
ual abuse or exploitation, or . . . failure to act which presents an immi-22. See esp. Gideon Yaffe, “A Procedural Rationale for the Necessity Defense,” Journal
of Value Inquiry 43 ð2009Þ: 369–90, 372–78. I should note that Yaffe doubts that the
necessity defense is best characterized as a justificatory defense. Rather, he thinks, it is a
procedural estoppel defense, much like the defense of double jeopardy. If the government
were to find the defendant guilty, its conduct would be “inconsistent in some way with some
prior government conduct with respect to the defendant” ð371Þ, vis-a`-vis its authority over
her.
23. As Douglas Husak notes in his Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law
ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2008Þ, there is in law a presumption against overinclusion/
overcriminalization ðsee 154Þ; such a presumption, however, can be justified only if over-
inclusion is generally worse than underinclusion.
24. See n. 15.
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Anent risk of serious harm” ðmy emphasisÞ.25 To be sure, when non-
exhaustive definitions are provided, they do not replace their defin-
ienda, and many states ðsuch as California, Connecticut, and KentuckyÞ
have followed the federal government in defining ‘neglect’ in this in-
complete way ðwith some variation of courseÞ.26 However, several states
ðincluding New Jersey, Texas, and UtahÞ do provide what appear to be
complete high-level definitions of ‘neglect’, that is, definitions that do
replace the “ordinary meaning” of the term even if they are intended
to capture or approximate it.27 Given these ðseemingly adequateÞ prox-
ies, what should we make of the claim that incommensurate multi-
dimensionality—and, hence, vagueness—is necessary in order to ade-
quately regulate conduct that is especially damaging to children?
The answer, I think, is this: for every way in which you can reason-
ably formulate a legal text that aims to adequately regulate conduct that
is especially damaging to children, it is the case that, necessarily, if law-
makers enact a normusing a text formulated in that way, then the resulting
law contains terms that are associated with multiple incommensurate di-
mensions and, hence, vague. Or, to put it another way, there are more
or less general ways, as well as more or less informative ways, in which
lawmakers might try to achieve the relevant purpose, but the law will be
multidimensional—and therefore vague—no matter which one of them
is chosen. In fact, I believe that in the case of neglect, the law will be
extravagantly vague, just as Endicott claims, since any proposal that can
be considered a means to the relevant end has to be multidimensional
in much the same way as ‘neglect’. The US definitions of ‘neglect’
mentioned in the previous paragraph are good examples of this.28 And
multidimensionality of that sort entails extravagant vagueness, if Endicott
is right.
I hope to have made a reasonable case for the claim that expres-
sions that cover classes of widely varying conduct do so not in virtue
of the fact that they are vague but rather in virtue of the fact that they
are associated with multiple—and often incommensurate—dimensions.
To be sure, the vagueness of the relevant terms is, by necessity, tied to
their multidimensionality, but not in a way that makes vagueness cen-
tral in our explanation of how the law can, or should, achieve regula-25. See The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101, 5116 et
seq.
26. California Welf. & Inst. Code § 300; Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 46b-120; Kentucky
Rev. Stat. § 600.020.
27. New Jersey Ann. Stat. § 9:6-8.21; Texas Fam. Code § 261.001; Utah Ann. Code
§ 78A-6-105.
28. Note that what makes these definitions multidimensional is not that they are disjunc-
tive but rather that each disjunct contains a term associated with multiple ðincommensurableÞ
dimensions.
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Ation of very broad classes of conduct. Rather, vagueness is a necessary
consequence of the feature that actually does facilitate reference to
these classes. To use vague terms, then, is something lawmakers have
to do in order to achieve certain valuable ends—it is indeed a practi-
cal necessity in some sense—but that does not make their vagueness a
means to those ends.
Next, I want to turn to what I take to be a broader payoff of the
foregoing critique. It is a payoff, I think, that applies not just to En-
dicott’s argument but also to a number of related arguments regarding
the instrumental value of vagueness in the law. If I am correct, these ar-
guments also wrongly attribute value to vagueness on the grounds that
it is a means to some end that is valuable for law.
V. WALDRON’S ARGUMENT FROM FACILITATION
It is sometimes said that vagueness in the law can be a good thing be-
cause it enables lawmakers to enact norms that are “flexible,” “open-
ended,” “elastic,” or “adaptable.” In a recent paper, for example, Jeremy
Waldron says that open-ended standards invoke people’s capacity for
practical deliberation in both structured and unstructured ways—that
is, it incentivizes them to act according to their own practical thinking
in certain circumstances.29 A vague traffic provision, for example, may
require one to make some appropriate—but unspecified—modification
to one’s driving behavior whenever a particular circumstance occurs.
Such a provision thus relies on, and—if internalized—invokes, the ca-
pacity of human agents to determine what behavior is appropriate given
the provision and the relevant circumstances.30 In doing so, Waldron
says, the law directs subjects to consider a multitude of factors that
may combine in various ways to determine what they ought—by law—
to do. As he explains, a great variety of things—such as the narrowness
of the roadway, the amount of traffic, and the presence of children
playing on the road—may play a part in determining what modifica-
tion a driver ought to make to her driving behavior, given a traffic pro-
vision requiring people to drive at a ‘reasonable or proper’ speed.31
Our general capacity to deliberate about action in this way is, ac-
cording to Waldron, a valuable one—in fact, it is what the dignity of a
human agent consists in. The law, in issuing vague norms, he says, re-
spects this dignity by “½crediting the subject with the sophisticated
ability to adapt ½her agency to ½her own practical thinking when this is29. Jeremy Waldron, “Vagueness and the Guidance of Action,” in Marmor and
Soames, Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law, 58–82.
30. Ibid., 64.
31. Ibid.
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Arequired of ½her.”32 In doing so, the law recognizes the moral stand-
ing that a person has in a society.33
On the basis of this, Waldron concludes about the value of vague-
ness in the law that “½it is good to focus on the need for legislative
flexibility ½in certain areas. . . . The adaptability of law, secured pre-
cisely by what others would call its indeterminacy, is . . . a valuable
legislative resource and a respectful one too, for it works in tandem
with the most sophisticated understanding of people’s powers of prac-
tical reasoning.”34 Thus, Waldron takes vagueness to be valuable for law
on the grounds that enacting extravagantly vague norms makes the law
flexible and open-ended, which in turn invokes a capacity the exercise
of which realizes the dignity of human agents. According to Waldron,
then, vagueness in the law is a good thing because it is a facilitating—or
partial—means to invoking people’s capacity for practical deliberation in
a special way.35
In the interest of clarity, let us analyze Waldron’s argument in the
following way:3
3
222, 2
status
discu
believ
conse
3
3
3
discu
3
pro tan
may h
ll use P1. Invoking people’s capacity for practical deliberation in a way
that realizes the dignity of human agents is good.
P2. Vagueness in the law is a facilitating—or partial—means to in-
voking people’s capacity for practical deliberation in a way that
realizes the dignity of human agents.
P3. Value transmits from ends to means.36
C. Vagueness in the law is ðsometimesÞ instrumentally good.37Structurally, the argument is nearly identical to Endicott’s, except that
the second premise is a claim about facilitating means, rather thannec-
essary means. I will argue that Waldron’s conclusion about the value of2. Ibid., 65.
3. Jeremy Waldron, “How Law Protects Dignity,”Cambridge Law Journal 71 ð2012Þ: 200–
01–2. I should note that in Waldron’s view, dignity is not a value concept but rather a
concept, designating what we he calls high-ranking social status. For the purposes of my
ssion in this article, however, this difference is immaterial, since Waldron clearly
es that it is a good thing to assign such high rank to everyone and that it is—
quently—one of law’s virtues that it facilitates and protects such an assignment.
4. Waldron, “Vagueness and the Guidance of Action,” 82.
5. Thanks to a reviewer at Ethics for helpful comments on this section.
6. As in the case of Endicott’s argument, I take P3 to transmit pro tanto value; see
ssion in Sec. I.
7. Also as in the case of Endicott’s argument, I take it thatWaldron is assuming that the
to goodness that vagueness in the law has is not outweighed by any pro tanto badness it
ave. Alternatively, we can limit the conclusion to pro tanto goodness.
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Avagueness in the law rests on a conflation of two distinct notions of flex-
ibility and open-endedness, one properly associated with vagueness and
the other withmultidimensionality. If what I say is correct, the support for
Waldron’s instrumental premise ðP2Þ goes away—wewill have reason to be
skeptical that vagueness is a means to invoking people’s capacity for prac-
tical deliberation in the relevant way. Instead, as before, multidimen-
sionality seems to be doing the work.
To be sure, as several authors have noted, vagueness in an impor-
tant sense does allow for flexibility and open-endedness in the law.38
Sometimes, lawmakers—for various reasons—do not want to settle be-
forehand how to classify borderline cases. It is better to deal with them in
the courts, if and when they come up, since that allows decision makers
to evaluate, for each case, whether it ðand sufficiently similar onesÞ should
be within or outside the reach of the law ðand for what reasonsÞ. This is
indeed appropriately characterized as flexibility or open-endedness, and
vagueness does help bring this about.
However, this is not the only way in which it is valuable that the
law is flexible or open-ended. Often, the relevant—and usually more
pressing—matter is that lawmakers do not want to draw sharp lines that
make determinate cases fall on the wrong side of law’s boundary, vis-a`-
vis the relevant law’s rationale. If there is an indefinite variety of ways,
for example, in which one can neglect a child, the worry is not that
using more specific language will arbitrarily settle borderline cases of
neglect but rather—as we have seen—that some determinate cases of ne-
glect will not be covered by law and that some determine cases of non-
neglect will be. And this matter has to do with multidimensionality, rather
than vagueness.
If we attend to why it is that terms like ‘reasonable’ invoke the
deliberative capacity that Waldron appreciates, we see that his argu-
ment really concerns this latter notion of flexibility and open-endedness:
“The legislature does not want ½certain norms pinned down to a precise
and exact meaning that will govern all future cases; that would detract
from the very elasticity that it is aiming at and it would detract from the
sort of active consideration by citizens that it is seeking authoritatively to
elicit. . . . If someone asks about the meaning of ‘reasonable’ or ‘appro-
priate’, all we can do is indicate that these are flexible all-purpose pred-
icates of evaluation that invite us to consider a number of possible factors
in an open-ended way.”39 It may of course vary between legal contexts38. See, e.g., Scott Soames, “Vagueness and the Law,” in The Routledge Companion to
Philosophy of Law, ed. Andrei Marmor ðNew York: Routledge, 2012Þ, 95–108; and As-
geirsson, “Vagueness and Power-Delegation.”
39. Waldron, “Vagueness and the Guidance of Action,” 74; my emphasis.
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Awhether it is—ultimately—a good idea to rely on subjects themselves
to make potentially complex judgments about what kind of behavior
is required of them in particular circumstances. Perhaps it turns out
that traffic provisions using terms like ‘reasonable’ and ‘proper’ are
generally a bad idea, whereas it might—as we have seen—be a good
idea to protect the interests of children using terms like ‘neglect’. In
Waldron’s view, however, there appears to be something distinctly val-
uable in invoking the capacity of human agents to determine how they
ought to behave, a value that is to some extent independent of consid-
erations regarding the adequate regulation of conduct that eludes spec-
ification. A multidimensional traffic provision, for example, might turn
out to be a bad idea all things considered, but it would still require people
to act according to their own practical thinking and thereby help realize
the dignity of human agents, on Waldron’s account. Thus, if Waldron is
right, there is something valuable about laws containing multidimensional
terms even in cases in which such law is ultimately undesirable, a value
deriving from the fact that it directs people to consider a multitude of
possible factors in an open-ended way, in an effort to determine what they
ought—by law—to do in the relevant circumstances.
Now, one might of course disagree with Waldron that invoking peo-
ple’s capacity for practical deliberation in this way genuinely realizes the
dignity of human agents. That is, one might want to reject Waldron’s P1.
For the sake of argument, however, I am at least prepared to accept that
it may be true. It may also be true that the value of employing terms like
‘reasonable’, ‘proper’, and ‘neglect’ in legal provisions has been under-
estimated, due to a failure to see how such provisions respect the dig-
nity of human agency. However, even if both these claims were true,
Waldron’s conclusion about the value of vagueness in the law would not
follow. The reason, I hope to have shown, is that the argument trades
on a conflation of the two notions of flexibility and open-endedness men-
tioned above. Thus, Waldron—and whoever argues in a similar vein—
wrongly associates vagueness with an instrumental role that is really played
by multidimensionality and, as a result, wrongly attributes instrumental
value to vagueness, at least in significant part.
I should note that at a certain point in his paper, Waldron indi-
cates that there is—so far as his argument is concerned—no need to dis-
tinguish between “unclarity, vagueness, and imprecision” or between
“ambiguity, vagueness, and contestability.”40 One might think, therefore,
that I am being somewhat uncharitable to Waldron—perhaps he is using
the term ‘vagueness’ as we often do in ordinary conversation, to cover all
sort of cases in which an utterance might provide insufficiently specific40. Ibid., 62, esp. n. 16.
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Ainformation, relative to the purpose of the relevant conversation ðbroadly
construedÞ.
However, although it may be the case that Waldron is primarily
using the term ‘vague’ in a broad sense, rather than the technical sense
it has in logic and philosophy of language, I still think his argument is
a fair target for my critique. The reason is that even if this is the case,
his claim that there is—for the purposes of his argument—no need to
distinguish between, for example, ambiguity, vagueness, and contest-
ability clearly indicates that he thinks that vagueness in the technical
sense is one of the sources of vagueness in the broader sense. But if
that is the case, then introducing the former into the law is a facilitat-
ing means to doing so with the latter. Given the transitivity of the is-a-
means-to relation, it follows that vagueness in the technical sense is a
facilitating means to invoking people’s capacity for practical delibera-
tion in a way that realizes the dignity of human agents, which is exactly
P2 above. Further, since value transmits from ends to means, estab-
lishing that vagueness in the broad sense can be a good thing suffices
to establish that vagueness in the technical sense can, too. Thus, I take
it that Waldron really is concerned with the value of vagueness in the
technical sense, despite the fact that he may also have something broader
in mind.
As in Endicott’s case, what I have said here does not decisively
show that Waldron’s P2 is false, but it gives us good reason to be skep-
tical. In any case, I hope to have showed that the premise is unsup-
ported by the considerations discussed by Waldron.
VI. POSSIBLE REPLY: VAGUENESS REALLY IS A MEANS
TO THE RELEVANT ENDS
The most natural response to my critique of Endicott and Waldron
would, I think, be to argue that, since incommensurate multidimension-
ality entails vagueness, using vague terms is really a necessary means to
using multidimensional terms and that—given the transitivity of the is-
a-means-to relation—value therefore does in fact transmit from the rele-
vant legislative ends to vagueness. If that is correct, then vagueness in the
law is still instrumentally valuable, although its value is perhaps not as
“immediate” as we might have thought.
This strategy certainly has some appeal, in particular in Endicott’s
case—evidenced, for example, by the intuitive force of the following
claim: in order to adequately regulate conduct that is especially damag-
ing to children, lawmakers have to use vague terms. If this statement of
practical necessity strikes us as true—and I have argued that it should—
then that seems to lend some support to the claim that vagueness isThis content downloaded from 131.227.177.015 on September 29, 2016 01:17:01 AM
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Aafter all a necessary means to the relevant legislative end. Perhaps, nec-
essary consequences of means to ends are also means to those ends—
which, if true, vindicates the instrumental premises of the two argu-
ments. Or so this line of response goes.
Despite its prima facie plausibility, I think we have good reason
to think that this strategy won’t work. As I hope to show, practical ne-
cessity sentences are not confined to expressing means-ends relations,
even if they are perhaps most commonly used in that way, and so true
statements of practical necessity don’t suffice to guarantee transmission
of value. The best explanation for this, I believe, is that it is not gen-
erally true that if something is a necessary consequence of a means to
some end, then it is also a means to that end—not even if it is some-
thing that one has to do in order to achieve that end.
Let me borrow and adapt an example from Jaegwon Kim to sub-
stantiate these claims.41 Say that Meletus sees to it that Socrates dies. By
doing so, he also sees to it that Xantippe becomes a widow. But there
is no causal relationship between Socrates’s dying and Xantippe’s be-
coming a widow—the dependence is of another sort.42 Imagine also, for
the sake of argument, that in order to protect the youth of Athens, Meletus
has to see to it that Socrates dies. Given the relation between seeing to
it that Socrates dies and seeing to it that Xantippe becomes a widow,
Meletus also has to see to it that Xantippe becomes a widow in order to
achieve his end—it is in some sense a practical necessity.
Suppose, then, that it is in fact valuable that Meletus sees to it that
the youth of Athens are protected and that—consequently—it is valu-
able that he sees to it that Socrates dies. It would seem odd to say that,
by the same token, it is valuable that Meletus sees to it that Xantippe
becomes a widow. Although her fate is something that has to be brought
about in order to achieve a valuable end, it is not a means to that end—
there is no interesting relation between her being or not being a widow
and the youth of Athens. Rather, Xantippes’s becoming a widow is just
a necessary by-product of something that does help bring the relevant
end about: Socrates’s dying. Hence, her fate seems to be a practical ne-41. Jaegwon Kim, “Noncausal Connections,” Nouˆs 8 ð1974Þ: 41–52.
42. This sort of dependency is often called Cambridge dependency ; see, e.g., ibid. For
those who don’t like Kim-style events and prefer Davidson-style events instead, I can make
the same point by arguing that value talk and reasons talk is intensional rather than
extensional. This isn’t very hard, since SDL assumes that only logically equivalent descrip-
tions can be substituted for one another. So even if we have theoretical reasons for saying
that the lawmakers’ using an incommensurately multidimensional term is in fact identical
with the lawmakers’ using a vague term and the former is instrumentally valuable, it does
not follow that the latter is also ðsince these events are identical without being logically
equivalentÞ.
This content downloaded from 131.227.177.015 on September 29, 2016 01:17:01 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Asgeirsson Instrumental Value of Vagueness in the Law 445
Acessity to which no value transmits. And the best explanation for this, it
seems to me, is that making Xantippe a widow is not a means to killing
Socrates.
Vagueness, I want to claim, is to lawmakers much like Xantippe’s be-
coming a widow is to Meletus. What is going on in law, on my account, is
that by using terms with multiple incommensurate dimensions, lawmak-
ers also use terms that are ðextravagantlyÞ vague. Thus, if the former is
something that lawmakers have to do in order, say, to adequately regu-
late conduct that is especially damaging to children, then so is the latter.
However, in order for value to transmit in the required way, practical
necessity is not enough—vagueness must also in some relevant sense
help bring about the relevant legislative ends. And vagueness, if I am
right, is not doing any of the work relevant to Endicott’s argument—that
is, there is no relevant connection between the vagueness of the relevant
terms and the ability of lawmakers to use them to adequately regulate the
relevant forms of conduct.
Granted, the relationship between incommensurate multidimen-
sionality and vagueness is tighter than the relationship between Socra-
tes’s dying and Xanthippe’s becoming a widow—after all, had Socrates
not been married, Xanthippe’s fate would have been quite different.
However, there are two general reasons why I don’t think this affects
my point. First, among the main general lessons to draw from the Xan-
thippe example is that it is not generally true that if something is a
necessary consequence of a means to some end, then it is also a means
to that end, because not all such consequences help bring about the
relevant ends. This, I have tried to show, is the case with vagueness
in the law—at least the kind discussed by Endicott. Neither does it
directly help bring about the relevant legislative ends, nor does it do so
indirectly—it is not the case that by using vague terms one helps bring
about that one uses terms with multiple incommensurate dimensions.
Second, if the relevant consequence in question isn’t doing any instru-
mental work, then there is simply nothing in virtue of which it has in-
strumental value, relative to the end in question. And this explains, I
submit, why value fails to transmit from the relevant regulatory ends to
vagueness, just as it explains how value fails to transmit to Xanthippe’s
becoming a widow.
These considerations carry over straightforwardly to Waldron’s case:
if value doesn’t generally transmit from ends to necessary consequences
of necessary means, then we have no reason to expect that value trans-
mits from ends to necessary consequences of merely facilitating—or par-
tial—means. The reason, as before, is that it is not generally true that
if something is a necessary consequence of a means to some end, then
it is also a means to that end. This applies equally to necessary meansThis content downloaded from 131.227.177.015 on September 29, 2016 01:17:01 AM
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Aand merely facilitating means and, thus, equally to the envisioned amend-
ments of the two arguments.
VII. ANOTHER POSSIBLE REPLY: THE LOGIC OF VALUE
VALIDATES CLOSURE UNDER NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE
In the previous section, I was concerned with showing that it is not
generally true that if something is a necessary consequence of a means
to some end, then it is also a means to that end. On the assumption
that value only transmits from ends to means, but not to necessary con-
sequences of those means, this allowed me to resist the conclusion that
vagueness in the law is a good thing. In this final section, I want to con-
sider what implications it has for my arguments in this article that Stan-
dard Deontic Logic ðSDLÞ validates closure under necessary consequence.43
Assuming we have at least a prima facie reason to expect the logic of
‘good’ to mirror the logic of ‘ought’ in significant ðif not allÞ respects,
the problem I face is that it makes sense to ask—given that I have con-
ceded that incommensurate multidimensionality is sometimes a good
thing—whether the logic of value forces on me the conclusion that vague-
ness is sometimes a good thing, too.
I don’t think it does; there are a number of ways to block the in-
ference, some of which require rejecting SDL and some of which do
not. The purpose of this final section, however, is not to catalog the
different possible responses but rather to acknowledge that—and illus-
trate how—in making claims about how to reason with value statements,
one incurs significant commitments in the logic of value.
First, we could reject closure under necessary consequence for
both the logic of ‘ought’ and the logic of ‘good’, which would amount
to rejecting SDL altogether. This would not be a novel move—many
authors have provided reasons for thinking that distribution over con-
junction ðfrom which closure under necessary consequence is crucially
derivedÞ is problematic in the case of ‘ought’. In particular, many of
the so-called paradoxes of deontic logic arise because of distribution
over conjunction.44 These paradoxes can more or less be reproduced
using value statements instead of ought statements, and so distribution
over conjunction seems equally problematic in the logic of value.However,
SDL happens to be a comparatively well-studied logic, being—as it is—a
normal modal logic, and so this strategy entails a very significant com-43. For a discussion of SDL, see, e.g., Risto Hilpinen and Dagfinn Føllesdal, “Deontic
Logic: An Introduction,” in Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, ed. Risto Hilpinen
ðDordrecht: Reidel, 1971Þ, 1–35.
44. For an overview of the paradoxes, see, e.g., Paul McNamara, “Deontic Logic,” in
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Zalta ðStanford, CA: Stanford University, 2014Þ,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/logic-deontic.
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Amitment: to provide a workable logic for both ‘ought’ and ‘good’, alter-
native to SDL.
Second, we could claim that the logic of ‘ought’ is closed under
necessary consequence but that the logic of ‘good’ is not. However, al-
though it allows us to retain SDL, this second strategy generates even
further commitments than the first, since we would incur a commit-
ment both to provide a workable logic for ‘good’ that does not vali-
date closure under necessary consequence and to explain why the logics
of ‘ought’ and ‘good’ diverge so radically. To be sure, there are signifi-
cant natural differences; for example, the phrase ‘it is good that’ is pre-
sumably factive, whereas ‘it ought to be the case that’ is not. However,
although such a difference will of course make for a difference in the
logics of the two notions, it is not so radical as to make one a normal
modal logic and the other not.
Third, we could hold that the logic of intrinsic value is closed un-
der necessary consequence but that the logic of instrumental value is
not. And since we are here concerned with the instrumental value of
vagueness, the problematic conclusion doesn’t follow. Perhaps, neces-
sary consequences of intrinsically good states of affairs are also them-
selves good, but the same is not true of states of affairs that are merely
instrumentally good. This is an attractive strategy but would generate a
commitment—in particular—to provide a workable logic of instrumen-
tal value, alternative to SDL.
Fourth, we could distinguish between types of value claims of the
form ‘it is good that p’ and ‘ x is good’ and argue that only the former
distributes over conjunction. Given my concession that it is good that
lawmakers use terms that have multiple incommensurate dimensions,
it would then follow that it is good that lawmakers use terms that are
vague. This conclusion, however, tells us nothing about the value of
vagueness, as such; it just tells us—to a rough approximation—that the
possible worlds in which lawmakers use vague terms are better than
some contextually determined standard or better than sufficiently many
other possible worlds in some relevant comparison class. That is, while the
conclusion does tell us something about the “normative status” of the
relevant possible worlds, it doesn’t tell us anything about in virtue of
what they have that status. Thus, nothing follows about the value of
vagueness, as such: on this account, that it is good that lawmakers use vague
terms does not entail that vagueness is good.45
As I said, the purpose of this final section is neither to catalog nor
to thoroughly discuss the possible responses to the apparent problem
posed by the attractiveness of closure under necessary consequence in45. And—on this account— that incommensurate multidimensionality is good and that incom-
mensurate multidimensionality entails vagueness do not together entail that vagueness is good.
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Athe logic of evaluative notions. It is important to emphasize, however,
that in making claims about how to reason with value statements, one
incurs deep commitments in logic. What I mean by this is not that
deontic logic—or the logic of evaluation, more broadly—is somehow the-
oretically prior to value theory or theories of practical reasoning. Rather,
I mean that logic serves as a significant constraint on such theories, in
the sense that it counts significantly against a theory if the resulting logic
proves unworkable. It should be clear, therefore, that limiting the princi-
ple of value transmission to the means-ends relationship—as I have done
in this article—is not without significant further commitment.This content downloaded from 131.227.177.015 on September 29, 2016 01:17:01 AM
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